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ARE WE HEADED FOR A CAPITAL SHORTAGE? 
by Dr. W I L L I A M C. FREUND, V ice President and Ch ie f Economist , The N e w York Stock Exchange 
Given the gradual pace of recovery, today's economic news 
has tended to alleviate our worries about the adequacy of 
capital investment. However, unless serious attention is 
given to the problems of capital formation in the economy, 
today's " g o o d " economic news may be replaced not too far 
down the road by news of renewed inflation, reduced rates 
of economic growth, and insufficient new jobs for our 
growing labor force. 
To be sure, the near-term business outlook is encour-
aging. The economic recovery is showing considerable 
internal energy. The momentum of expansion is solid, and 
wel l - founded. And few economists doubt the upturn wil l 
last more than a year, despite recent slowdowns. 
Is The Present Recovery Sound? 
Consumer outlays have spearheaded the economic 
recovery. Automobi le sales promise to total close to 10 
mil l ion in 1976, with imports down and domestic output up. 
Retail sales are also holding up, and consumer confidence 
is likely to receive another shot in the arm with a tax cut 
early this year. Moreover, recent moderation in consumer 
spending encourages the belief that the expansion wil l 
avoid excesses, thereby prolonging its duration. In the 
meantime, retail, wholesale, and manufacturing inven-
tories have had to be replenished in order to keep pace 
with sales, whi le the inventory sales ratio shows a need for 
greater product ion to maintain adequate supplies. 
The housing sector has not only turned up, but is begin-
ning to show considerable vigor. It seems reasonable to 
expect that total new housing starts in 1976 wil l reach well 
over 1.5 mil l ion. 
Inflation should hover around 6 percent for the begin-
ning of this calendar year. Al though the GNP price deflator 
came in just under 4 percent during the first quarter of 1976, 
this low rate wil l probably not be repeated soon. One 
reason is that the decline in wholesale food prices of a year 
ago is not likely to continue; the consumer price index also 
indicates a 6 percent inflation rate. 
Interest rates, short-term, may move upward in early 
1977, as bank loans rise to finance increased short-term 
demands and as the Federal Reserve System tries to main-
tain an even-keel posture. Long-term rates wil l probably 
not show any marked increase. The reason for moderate 
long-term credit demands by the corporate sector is that 
profits are expected to rise 25 to 30 percent in 1976, and 
perhaps another 10 to 15 percent in 1977. Retained earn-
ings wil l thus provide financial resources which would 
otherwise have to be supplied externally. Of course, any 
serious heating up of inflation wil l be reflected in long-term 
interest rates, but this development is not anticipated for 
the coming year. 
New plant and equipment spending is sluggish com-
pared to the relatively optimistic trends in consumer 
spending, inventory accumulation, housing, inflation, and 
interest rates. Whi le capital investments typically lag 
behind business cycle turns, the lag is generally no more 
than six months. The economy is now more than a year 
beyond the low point of the recession, however, and 
capital spending has yet to show a marked improvement. 
According to a Commerce Department survey taken in 
Apri l and May, business planned to spend $121.03 bil l ion on 
plant and equipment in 1976. Whi le this is a 7.3 percent gain 
over 1975, it represents only an 0.8 percent rise in " rea l " 
capital spending after stripping away the effects of infla-
t ion. This is considerably below the increases in real growth 
that hovered around 5 percent fol lowing the recession 
periods of 1957-58 and 1960-61, and around 2 percent fo l -
lowing the recessions of 1953-54 and 1970-71. 
This apparent stagnation in real business spending is dis-
concerting to economists, since 1976 was expected to be a 
" b o o m " year for capital goods industries. Whi le a further 
rise in capital investment is expected in 1977, a prolonged 
sluggishness in investment activity could dampen pros-
pects for a sustained recovery over the next few years. 
Indeed, unless capital spending rises more vigorously, 
bottlenecks and selected shortages wil l begin to appear, 
thus intensifying inflationary pressures. 
What are America's Capital Needs? 
While the near-term economic out look is bull ish, there are 
growing fears among a number of economists concerning 
the long-run growth of the economy. Wil l there be, for 
example, major capital shortages in the decade ahead— 
similar to the credit crunches of 1966 and 1969 and the 
extreme capital stringency in 1973-74? 
To corporate financial officers, those periods of capital 
shortage were not an abstract economic projection. Only 
the biggest and best-rated firms were able to obtain funds 
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in the financial markets. For intermediate and smaller firms, 
for the more innovative and risk-oriented, the pickings 
were lean and costs were high. Those were years w h e n 
equity f inancing dried up; when market prices often 
dropped below book values, and when P/E ratios col-
lapsed. T h e only recourse, even for some of the larger 
companies, was debt. The nation's f inancial structure 
emerged from these periods with a top-heavy debt 
structure and an uncomfortably high proport ion of short-
term corporate debt. 
The New York Stock Exchange, concerned over the 
future adequacy of capital in the United States, undertook a 
major research program to quantify the magnitude of 
America's capital needs—and its capacity to meet them. 
The Exchange's projections, which were publ ished in 
Capital Needs and Savings Potential 
of the US Economy, 1975-1985 
(Trillions) 
Capital needs 
Gross private domestic investment 
New plant and equipment 
Residential construction 
Other (private hospitals, schools, etc.} 
Financing federal deficits and federally 
sponsored credit agencies 
Net state and local government deficits 
Total capital needs 
Savings potential 
Business saving 
Capita! consumption allowances 
Corporate retained earnings 
Personal saving 
7~ota/ savings potential 
Capital shortfall or "gap" 
$2,568 
1,085 
.850 
.145 
.030 
$4,503 
.175 
$4,678 
2.359 
.564 
$2,923 
1.109 
$4.032 
_($ .646) 
September 1974, covered the interval between 1974 and 
1985. They assumed a 3.6 percent rate of growth in real G N P 
and a 5 percent annual rate of inflation. These estimates 
were based on extremely conservative assumptions. For 
example, the Exchange study assumed cumulat ive federal 
capital needs of $145 bi l l ion between 1974 and 1985, based 
upon peacetime budgetary patterns in the post-war period. 
This works out to roughly $12 bil l ion a year. Recent events 
clearly show how unrealistic that estimate was. In fiscal 
1975, the deficit totaled $43.6 bil l ion; in 1976 , $76 bil l ion; 
and in the new fiscal year ending in 1977, it will probably 
approach $60 bill ion. That adds up to almost $180 bi l l ion— 
$35 bil l ion more than the estimate for the full decade—and 
this is only to the end of 1977, not 1985. 
What capital might be available to meet such needs? T h e 
Exchange's report also projected that the savings capacity 
of the e c o n o m y — b o t h corporate and personal—was just 
over $4.0 tril l ion. T h e difference between that f igure and 
the $4.7 tril l ion in capital needs represents a shortfall, or 
gap, of some $650 bill ion. 
However, the Exchange may have understated the 
potential for a capital shortage. Research on the savings 
behavior of consumers by Professor Martin Feldstein of 
Harvard concludes that participation in the Social Security 
System entails a decrease in private savings and a 
consequent net decrease in national savings. This is not a 
criticism of the Social Security System, which has gone a 
long way toward providing financial independence for 
mill ions of retired Americans. But with a pay-as-you-go 
method of f inancing Social Security, benefits a re paid out of 
current receipts and are not accumulated in a capital 
market sense. Social Security is really a system for trans-
ferring vast amounts of income from the current genera-
tion of workers to retired workers. Its effect on longer-run 
saving propensities was inadequately reflected in the 
Exchange's saving projections. 
Economists recognize, of course, that the idea of a " g a p " 
is simply a convenient way of dramatizing the prospect of 
insufficiency. N o one knows for sure whether the " g a p " 
will be $650 bil l ion, or $250 bil l ion, or $850 bil l ion, or any 
other number. T h e gap is merely a description of a long-run 
tendency for financial demands to outrun supplies. A n 
actual shortage w o u l d never be observable, since the 
normal interplay of economic forces would balance the 
d e m a n d and supply of funds. The p h e n o m e n o n of a capital 
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shortage would be evident in rising interest rates— 
promoted by increasing competit ion for an inadequate 
supply of savings—and by reduced credit availability to all 
but the strongest borrowers. 
The result would be an accelerating stream of economic 
problems—among them forced postponement of wor th-
while projects for which no financing is available, declining 
productivity, rising prices and, inevitably, renewed infla-
tionary pressures. 
Is there a Shortage? 
In the past year, little has been heard about a capital 
shortage—and for good reason. Periods of recession are 
marked by declining financial demands, as working capital 
needs decrease, as inventory buying eases, and as capital 
spending declines. At such times, mortgage loans and con-
sumer credit demands also diminish. 
In the summer of 1974, when the New York Stock 
Exchange prepared its widely publicized projections of 
capital needs for the next decade, it was recognized that a 
decline in economic activity would resolve any problems of 
capital scarcity. Such shortages wil l not develop at times of 
ample productive capacity and excessive unemployment. 
Simply put, a stagnant economy wil l not exhibit symptoms 
of a capital shortage. But obviously, a state of recession is 
hardly the way to "so lve" a capital shortage. 
Clearly then, capital shortages wil l not occur in every year 
between now and 1985. The Exchange's projections simply 
point to the distinct l ikel ihood that major financial 
In A.D. 260 in Oxyrhynchus, during the short rule 
of Macrianus and Quietus, the tremendous 
depreciation of the currency led to a formal strike 
of the managers of the banks of exchange. They 
closed their doors and refused to accept and 
to exchange the imperial currency. 
—M. ROSTOVTZEFF 
disruptions wil l occur f rom time to time over the next 
decade—similar to the severe capital shortage situations 
experienced three times in the past decade. 
Whi le the recent recession has served to ease current 
capital requirements, it would be shortsighted to assume 
that capital shortages are a thing of the past. Indeed 
corporate financial officers are keeping their fingers 
crossed and their powder dry. Though they have improved 
the structure of their financial statements by refunding 
short-term debt, and are currently using the good f low of 
corporate profits to strengthen their equity base and l iquid 
asset posit ion, there is still a long way to go. In this regard, 
several indicators still show heavy pressure on balance 
sheet positions. For example, the interest coverage ratio, 
the sum of pre-tax earnings plus interest expenses divided 
by interest expense, remains at a relatively low level. The 
interest burden becomes even heavier when pre-tax 
earnings are adjusted for inventory profits. Also, while cash 
f low is showing marked improvement, inadequate depre-
ciation set-asides continue to erode the corporate capital 
base. In many instances, corporate dividends are still in 
excess of retained earnings adjusted to account for 
inventory profits and replacement cost depreciation. 
The restraint shown by corporate financial officers in 
their plant and equipment expenditures undoubtedly 
reflects the influence of past capital shortages. Whi le this 
new conservatism should enable business to face the future 
with greater financial strength, it may have the deleterious 
effect of inhibit ing needed capital formation. 
The Challenge of Capital Formation 
Increased levels of capital formation are needed if the US is 
to achieve economic growth with low inflation. Even Great 
Britain is beginning to learn—one hopes not too late—that 
wi thout adequate production and productivity, a nation 
can neither meet the aspirations of its people nor survive in 
an internationally competit ive marketplace. 
As previously noted, capital spending plans in the United 
States still appear too restrained for this phase of the 
business cycle. Unless capital spending begins to rise more 
vigorously, inflation may indeed intensify down the road, as 
bottlenecks and selected shortages begin to mar the 
economic scene. 
Some economists have been belitt l ing the dangers of 
shortages down the road because of what they perceive to 
be our reserve capacity for product ion. However, one 
should not be misled by official figures on operating rates. 
It is true that for the first quarter of this year, industry 
generally was reported to be producing at only 72 percent 
of capacity, compared with a preferred operating rate of 
around 95 percent. 
However, the Federal Reserve System has now changed 
its method of computing capacity util ization figures, and 
the revised figures show that operating rates were closer to 
80 percent. Indeed, in some materials-producing indus-
tries, actual capacity util ization is already in the mid-80's 
and in some instances heading into the 90 percent range. In 
any event, as output rises against existing capacity, 
bottleneck situations are likely to develop. 
Overall, it appears that if business does not soon make a 
commitment for stronger capital investment, physical 
shortages may begin to occur in selected industries in 
another year or two—assuming that the economy con-
tinues to expand under the push of consumer and 
If no such settlement is made [by money changers] 
they shall be proclaimed bankrupt and disgraced 
by the public crier in the places in which they 
failed and throughout Catalonia. They shall be 
beheaded, and their property shall be sold for the 
satisfaction of their creditors by the court. 
—ACTS OF THE CORTEZ 
government spending. It is, of course, always possible that 
the recovery itself wil l run out of steam, and that, as a result, 
operating rates wil l not rise further. America could also 
place greater reliance on imports to meet domestic needs. 
These are indeed possibilities. Nonetheless, it behooves 
economic policymakers not to ignore the possibility of 
bottlenecks appearing in the supply of such key industrial 
commodities as paper, steel, plastics, and textiles. The 
possibility of such a situation points up the importance of 
adequate investment incentives to capital format ion, not 
only to meet longer-term economic goals, but to accom-
modate shorter-run needs as wel l . 
Fortunately, there is a growing recognition of the 
problem among economists, corporate financial officers, 
and others. For example, the Brookings Institution con-
cluded in a recent report that unless the federal govern-
ment ran a surplus—not merely a balanced budget—a 
capital shortage was likely. Other scholars, including 
Professor Benjamin Friedman of Harvard and Dr. Henry 
Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board, have expressed 
similar conclusions. 
The President's Economic Report for 1976 contained, for 
the first t ime, a section enti t led, "Wi l l Capital Requirements 
for the Remainder of This Decade be Met?" Based upon a 
detailed input-output analysis by industry, prepared by the 
Commerce Department, the report concluded that capital 
needs may go unsatisfied in the years ahead, resulting in 
inadequate capacity, growth, and jobs. The analysis stressed 
that the capital needs of both the private and public sectors 
would need to be supplemented by large expenditures to 
provide for (1) meeting environmental objectives and (2) 
responding to our national energy needs. 
In an article published last spring by the Morgan 
Guaranty Bank, Professor John Kendrick of George 
Washington University concluded that " i f after-tax profit 
rates are not adequate, the growth of capital per person 
engaged in product ion wil l be less than in the past, which 
wil l tend to reduce the growth of labor productivity and 
real income per capita. Even worse, capacity bottlenecks 
may again appear in the latter 1970s, as in 1973 and 1974, 
making more unlikely the achievement of high-level 
employment." 
Much more work needs to be done to impress upon 
policymakers the urgent task of promoting capital forma-
t ion. It is not enough for professionals to talk to one 
another. Obviously, this is a pocketbook issue which wil l 
ultimately affect everybody in this country. Still, it is 
encouraging that, in a period when the economy is leaving 
recession behind, so many experts are pointing to the 
longer-run importance of stimulating private investment. 
Conclusion 
Unless this nation can f ind a viable way of increasing its 
commitment to productive investment, demand through 
the next decade wil l continue to press against supply—with 
the inevitable consequences of renewed inflationary 
pressures, industrial bottlenecks, and inadequate job 
opportunit ies. To be sure, many of these potential 
problems have been obscured by the past recession; but as 
the economy continues to move upward, policymakers had 
better begin planning how to avoid a replay of the dismal 
economic scenario of the recent past. 
It would require another article, or several, to address 
adequately the long-run policies needed to spur capital 
investments. Included would be the need for eliminating 
Federal deficits in periods of economic prosperity which 
siphon funds away f rom private investments; more realistic 
depreciation guidelines; and tax policies to encourage risk 
taking. Such tax policies might include a liberalization of 
the current method of taxing capital gains and a phase-out 
of the double taxation of dividends—which has produced a 
mountain of corporate debt instead of more equity 
investment. 
By worrying now about the prospect of a major 
investment capital shortage, we can stimulate constructive 
planning to avoid it. By contrast, complacency can only 
cause far deeper worry—and necessitate far more drastic 
corrective measures—later. & 
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